La crisis multidimensional por la que atraviesa actualmente la humanidad coloca en primer plano la cuestión, más que de «la salida de la crisis», de la superación de los condicionamientos negativos que han conducido a ella. Más allá de las causas próximas reconocibles se hallan las apuestas paradigmáticas, la Weltanschauung dominante que inspira las conductas erróneas. En el artículo se sostiene que a la metafísica materialista —que el autor distingue del ateísmo—, en tanto que idea-guía principal de la modernidad, corresponde (...) gran parte de la responsabilidad por las patologías de la sociedad actual, a cuyo clímax estamos asistiendo. Se asume que el mundo ha experimentado tales transformaciones que ninguna de las concepciones metafísicas o criptometafísicas a las que estamos acostumbrados sirve para fundamentar una guía de actuación capaz de sacarnos del atolladero. Y se propone una idea de fondo que se estima que sí podría hacerlo: un noocentrismo, la consideración de la consciencia como la realidad fundamental y, por supuesto, referencial. Un neoespiritualismo, si se quiere, capaz de fundamentar una Ética universal, y orientado a la liberación individual y colectiva del ser humano, en armonía con una Naturaleza entendida como de igual importancia, y dejando atrás el espejismo pseudocientífico —y en realidad sojuzgador y bloqueante— del materialismo metafísico. (shrink)

La primera de las virtudes sociales es la justicia. Una ley o institución que no se ajuste a la misma, debe ser reformada o abolida. En el siglo XVI, en la archidiócesis de Lima se emitió abundante legislación canónica que concernía de manera particular al indígena. Puesto que las leyes de la Iglesia ejercían un influjo directo sobre la vida del ciudadano tanto o más que las civiles, en este artículo se analizarán los cánones de los tres primeros Sínodos diocesanos (...) limenses que guardan relación con las “fiestas de guardar”, para comprobar su incidencia en la mayor o menor justicia que pudo impregnar el mundo laboral. Para alcanzar tal fin, nos hemos servido de los principios de justicia propuestos por John Rawls. Ellos nos ayudarán a descubrir si las constituciones sinodales emitidas fomentaron leyes e instituciones que mejoraron la vida de trabajo de los indios. (shrink)

The analysis of so-called ?strategic intentional fouls? (SIF) as well as the discussion of their validity in the normative systems of sports have a long track record. These fouls can be characterised as rule violations committed in order to be detected and which accept the corresponding sanction. However, there is an additional goal of obtaining an advantage or subsequent benefit in the competition. In fact, this practice is not infrequent and it is even occasionally accepted by the players themselves, referees, (...) judges, sports authorities and spectators. In this work I have analysed the internal structure of SIFs (the features of an axiological gap and a ?special intention?) with a view to providing a deeper understanding and stressing the differences with closely related concepts: cheating, and especially fraus legis or what in Anglo-Saxon culture is called ?spoiling the game?. Finally, I try to show some difficulties in distinguishing SIF from gamesmanship. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the legal case involving the Court of Arbitration of Sport, the Union of European Football Associations, and the Turkish team Eskişehirspor to analyze the leg...

"The book presents in accessible fashion recent important work on the self and self-consciousness and also moves the issues forward with interesting new ideas. It provides a notably crisp and clear treatment of some extremely intriguing topics." -- Jane Heal, Department of Philosophy, University of Cambridge In this book, José Luis Bermú dez addesses two fundamental problems in the philosophy and psychology of self-consciousness: (1) Can we provide a noncircular account of fully fledged self-conscious thought and language in (...) terms of more fundamental capacities? (2) Can we explain how fully fledged self-conscious thought and language can arise in the normal course of human development? Bermú dez argues that a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) arises from the apparent strict interdependence between self-conscious thought and linguistic self-reference. The paradox renders circular all theories that define self-consciousness in terms of linguistic mastery of the first-person pronoun. It seems to follow from the paradox of self-consciousness that no such account or explanation can be given. Drawing on recent work in empirical psychology and philosophy, the author argues that any explanation of fully fledged self-consciousness that answers these two questions requires attention to primitive forms of self-consciousness that are prelinguistic and preconceptual. Such primitive forms of self-consciousness are to be found in somatic proprioception, the structure of exteroceptive perception, and prelinguistic forms of social interaction. The author uses these primitive forms of self-consciousness to dissolve the paradox ofself-consciousness and to show how the two questions can be given an affirmative answer. (shrink)

Thinking Without Words provides a challenging new theory of the nature of non-linguistic thought. Jose Luis Bermudez offers a conceptual framework for treating human infants and non-human animals as genuine thinkers. The book is written with an interdisciplinary readership in mind and will appeal to philosophers, psychologists, and students of animal behavior.

Con la finalidad de contribuir a los estudios de recepción de la obra de Søren Kierkegaard en México, este artículo presenta un análisis de su presencia en la obra escrita de Alfonso Reyes y Juan José Arreola. Para ello se abordan de manera sucinta los parámetros de recepción mundial y nacional del danés, para proseguir con el análisis puntual de las menciones explícitas de Reyes y Arreola, con esto se brindan herramientas de comprensión de Kierkegaard en la obra de (...) los mexicanos y se atiende a subsanar un faltante en los estudios de recepción kierkegaardiana allende el ámbito filosófico académico. (shrink)

Our research has found that companies which have diverged from traditional management in order to adopt strategies which include ethics, cooperation and a joint vision of management obtain a greater added value. The new challenges of competitiveness require a position of active cooperation between firms and their suppliers, which should be considered as collaborators rather than adversaries. An active cooperation management may well allow the company to improve the quality of its products and its image, speed up delivery to its (...) clients and make its production and trading more agile, thus enhancing the perception the client has of the product. An improved ethical quality in our dealings, generating trust, improving communication and establishing long-term relationships with joint added value, results in higher competitiveness and greater creation of wealth. (shrink)

Frames and framing make one dimension of a decision problem particularly salient. In the simplest case, framesprimeresponses (as in, e.g., the Asian disease paradigm, where the gain frame primes risk-aversion and the loss frame primes risk-seeking). But in more complicated situations frames can function reflectively, by making salient particular reason-giving aspects of a thing, outcome, or action. For Shakespeare's Macbeth, for example, his feudal commitments are salient in one frame, while downplayed in another in favor of his personal ambition. The (...) role of frames in reasoning can give rise torational framing effects. Macbeth can prefer fulfilling his feudal duty to murdering the king, while also preferring bravely taking the throne to fulfilling his feudal duty, knowing full well that bravely taking the throne just is murdering the king. Such patterns ofquasi-cyclicalpreferences can be correct and appropriate from the normative perspective of how one ought to reason. The paper explores three less dramatic types of rational framing effects: (1) Consciously framing and reframing long-term goals and short-term temptations can be important tools for self-control. (2) In the prototypical social interactions modeled by game theory, allowing for rational framing effects solves longstanding problems, such as the equilibrium selection problem and explaining the appeal of non-equilibrium solutions (e.g., the cooperative solution in the Prisoner's Dilemma). (3) Processes for resolving interpersonal conflicts and breaking discursive deadlock, because they involve internalizing multiple and incompatible ways of framing actions and outcomes, in effect create rational framing effects. (shrink)

Table of Contents Acknowledgments 1 Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Introduction by Naomi Eiland, Anthony Marcel and José Luis Bermúdez 2 The Body Image and Self-Consciousness by John Campbell 3 Infants’ Understanding of People and Things: From Body Imitation to Folk Psychology by Andrew N. Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore 4 Persons, Animals, and Bodies by Paul F. Snowdon 5 An Ecological Perspective on the Origins of Self by George Butterworth 6 Objectivity, Causality, and Agency by Thomas (...) Baldwin 7 At Two with Nature: Agency and the Development of Self-World Dualism by James Russell 8 Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View by José Luis Bermúdez 9 Proprioception and the Body Image by Brian O’Shaughnessy 10 Awareness of One’s Own Body: An Attentional Theory of Its Nature, Development, and Brain Basis by Marcel Kinsbourne 11 Body Schema and Intentionality by Shaun Gallagher 12 Living without Touch and Peripheral Information about Body Position and Movement: Studies with Deafferented Subjects by Jonathan Cole and Jacques Paillard 13 Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership by M. G. F. Martin 14 Bodily Awareness and the Self by Bill Brewer 15 Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription by Quassim Cassam 16 Consciousness and the Self by Naomi Eilan Contributors Index. (shrink)

A central discussion in the theory of deliberative democracy in recent decades has focused on whether democratic deliberation, and consequently those participating in it, should aim, at least ideally, for political consensus. Thus, pluralist deliberative democrats have criticized the consensualist approach to deliberative democracy for neglecting the moral importance of political disagreement because of their fixation with reaching consensus. The debate between these two positions, initiated in the 1990s, has evolved in recent years toward more precision and sophistication. However, some (...) vagueness and ambiguities remain in many of the contributions and prevent us from getting an exact idea of the object of discussion. This article starts making further distinctions about several types of agreement and disagreement in order to clarify much more precisely the exact niche of dispute between these two views. They do not need to disagree on the value of many forms of disagreement and consensus. Their dispute consists only in a controversy about the relative value of post-deliberative, operative, substantive, legislative, regulatory, or adjudicative reason-based consensus as opposed to the corresponding reason-based disagreement. Finally, the article argues that this relatively small niche is made smaller by certain considerations. The most important of them is that this controversy remains at a high theoretical level and lacks practical importance: it only affects the kind of personal ideal commitment or aspiration that virtuous deliberators should have when entering into a deliberative process, and has no concrete consequent institutional implications. (shrink)

Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving is their (...) satisfaction of certain basic conditions deriving from a general account of representation-driven behaviour that is neutral on the question of concept possession. It is also argued that creatures can be in states with nonconceptual content even though they possess no conceptual abilities at all. (shrink)

La elección del concepto de phrónesis tiene para Gadamer un doble objetivo: unir la hermenéutica y la ética de Aristóteles, y presentar el problema de la aplicación del conocimiento moral como el modelo de problema hermenéutico. Teniendo en cuenta las aportaciones críticas de E. Tugendhat, aquí se analizan algunas dificultades en el planteamiento de Gadamer derivadas de la imposibilidad de la phrónesis para aplicar correctamente el conocimiento moral y para justificar lo que es moralmente válido. Así mismo, se muestra cómo (...) afectan estas dificultades en la comprensión de las estructuras del proceso de aprendizaje moral y del proceso reflexivo sobre uno mismo. (shrink)

Beyond different starting points, stakeholder theory and Catholic Social Thought share many compatible perspectives when analyzing the role of the firm in economic activity, especially regarding the attention of the firm to different social and economic actors. Additionally, ST bears limitations regarding its ethical and anthropological foundation, and also about the legitimation of the different stakeholders’ interests. Therefore, ST lacks clear criteria to solve possible conflicts of interest between stakeholders. This paper analyzes the potentiality of ST, widely accepted in corporate (...) management, to integrate CST principles in order to solve those conflicts. At the same time, the paper studies the possibility of finding in the principles of CST an anthropological and ethical foundation for ST. This foundation could be the source of criteria to discuss the levels of legitimation and prioritization between stakeholders´ interests, especially when those interests collide. (shrink)

In this work I offer a panorama of the diverse areas where the philosophical reflection has been developed during these last years: the conceptual, ethical and aesthetic questions. The conceptual problems of the sport have turned around: 1) game and sport; 2) the paper of the rules and the values in the sportive normative system; 3) the competitive character and playful of the sport. The more debated ethical questions have been: 1) sport and gender; 2) sport and nationalism; 3) sport (...) and violence. (shrink)

This work analyzes the ideas developed by Arendt and Sartre regarding liberty and action. For Sartre, when we act, we modify the structure of the world, hoping for a fore seen result. The condition for the act is the liberty of the for-it self, as an absolute de parture point. The act projects t..

This chapter considers a deflationary or minimalist construal of the nature of nonlinguistic thought that might be deployed to finesse the apparent need to attribute thoughts to creatures that are not language-users. The aim of the minimalist proposal is to show that thinking behavior in nonlinguistic creatures can be understood in nonpropositional and perceptual terms, rather than through the attribution of propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires. In opposition to this the book suggest that there are important types of (...) nonlinguistic thought that cannot be accommodated in the manner proposed by the minimalists. The requirements of psychological explanation often demand that we attribute to nonlinguistic creatures thoughts that are structured, represent the world in a highly determinate way, and reflect the particular mode of presentation under which the creature apprehends its environment. (shrink)

A theory of nonlinguistic thought is incomplete without an account of nonlinguistic reasoning and the norms of rationality by which such reasoning is governed. This chapter tries to show how an account of nonlinguistic rationality emerges when we pose the question: What could count as evidence that a nonlinguistic creature is behaving rationally? There are several different forms of evidence that can come into play here. At the most sophisticated level, a creature is behaving rationally when it is sensitive to (...) the consequences of different courses of action, but there are types of rationality that do not involve such consequence-sensitivity. Different forms of rationality are appropriate to different types of explanation, and this chapter draws a distinction between level 1 rationality and level 2 rationality that maps onto the distinction between explanations of the type proposed by the minimalist and explanations that make use of belief-desire psychology. (shrink)